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I. INTRODUCTION
In the typical soft-tissue automobile accident personal injury
case tried today, it is doubtful that a single issue presents as much
importance to the outcome of the case as the factual question of
whether the plaintiff has met a statutory "tort threshold," namely
that he or she has suffered an injury which resulted in death, per-
manent injury or disfigurement, over $4,000 in medical treatment,
or at least 60 days of disability. Even where liability is "cold" (i.e.
the proverbial drunk driver rear-ender case), and the plaintiff has
presented evidence that he has met not just one of the thresholds
(and only one is needed) but all of them, the plaintiff can still walk
away from the case with a zero recovery if the jury does not find that
he has met at least one of these thresholds.
The critical importance of these tort thresholds is not acciden-
tal. Indeed, they lay at the very heart of the Minnesota No-Fault
t Partner, Yaeger, Jungbauer, Barczak & Roe, PLC, Minneapolis, MN. J.D.,
cum laude, 1981, William Mitchell College of Law. Mr. Weiner is a trial lawyer who
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1. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996).
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Act (the Act).2 As explained by the court in Coughlin v. LaBounty:
One of the stated purposes of the No-Fault Act is to pre-
vent litigation over automobile accident claims. As such,
the No-Fault Act substitutes first party insurance as the
remedy for the majority of personal injury claims. The
tort thresholds represent a safety valve for the victim who
is so severely injured that the no-fault insurance limits are so
inadequate as to be unjust. Thresholds are established to
reserve only the more serious personal injury cases for third party
litigation.
Enacted in 1974, the Act had two primary goals, to see that
every person injured in a motor vehicle accident, regardless of their
fault or innocence, recovers quickly and easily from their own insur-
ance company their "economic loss" benefits, generally their medi-
cal bills and wage loss.* However, as a quid pro quo for what was
supposed to be quick and automatic recovery of these basic eco-
nomic loss benefits through now-mandated no-fault insurance, the
Legislature sought to eliminate the overcompensation of victims
and reduce the number of lawsuits arising out of motor vehicle ac-
6cidents. To accomplish this end, the Legislature placed a new
hurdle in the way of the injured motor vehicle accident victim, with
the idea of lessening the number of claims. "Less seriously" injured
victims would automatically recover their medical bills and wage
loss, but that was all they could recover.! The Act took away their
common law right to recover non-economic damages such as pain
and suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss
2. See id. § 65B.41 (designating Sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 of the Minnesota
Statutes as the "Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act").
3. 354 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
4. Id. at 52 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing MINN. STAT. §
65B.42(4)).
5. See Developments in Minnesota Law - I. Automobile Insurance, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 785, 865 (1974):
[n]o-fault insurance has been supported on the grounds that it will af-
ford prompt and certain recovery of immediate out-of-pocket medical
expenses and loss of wages, that it will lower the cost of insurance, that it
will prevent the relative overcompensation of accident victims, and that it
will speed the administration ofjustice by removing a significant number
of negligence suits from crowded court calendars.
6. See id.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996) (prohibiting recovery of "none-
conomic detriment" damages if an injured individual did not meet the threshold
of at least $4,000 in "reasonable medical expenses"). This article refers to those
persons with medical expenses of less than $4,000 as "less seriously" injured and
those persons with medical expenses greater than $4,000 as "seriously" injured.
[Vol. 24
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of consortium.8 "Seriously" injured victims, on the other hand, re-
tained all of their rights to these traditional common law damages.9
The key question for the Legislature, then, in drafting the No-
Fault Act, was how to separate the two classes of victims, keeping in
mind that an entire class (i.e. the less seriously injured) was to be
denied any recovery of non-economic benefits. The answer, of
course, is found in the no-fault thresholds contained in section
65B.51 of the Minnesota Statutes. The consequences of which class
the victim falls into are obviously critical when pursuing a tort ac-
tion, because the typical plaintiff has had all of his or her medical
bills and wage loss paid for by no-fault, and the primary damages
sought in a tort lawsuit are non-economic damages, the very dam-
ages that are dependent upon meeting a tort threshold.
This article will examine the no-fault thresholds found in sec-
tion 65B.51, an analysis which requires one to keep in mind that
the very purpose of the Act is to deny an entire class of automobile
accident victims certain damages while at the same time allowing
the seriously injured victim to recover all the traditional tort dam-
ages.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A complete review of the legislative history of the tort thresh-
olds in section 65B.51, while beyond the scope of this article, is not
only interesting but may prove helpful in a particular case. A thor-
ough analysis of both the legislative history of the Minnesota
thresholds (as well as the rest of the Act), and a comparison of the
Minnesota thresholds with approaches taken in other jurisdictions
to accomplish the same goals, was made by Professor Michael
Steenson shortly after the Act was enacted. 10 Professor Steenson
examined the initial thresholds in the first bill that was introduced
(as well as its source, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Repara-
tions Act), and the amendments which followed in both the Senate
and the House, all of which reduced the descriptive thresholds
from the initial "significant permanent injury," "serious permanent
8. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 65B.43, subd. 8 (1996) (defining "non-economic
detriment" as "all dignitary losses suffered by any person ... including pain and
suffering, loss of consortium, and inconvenience").
9. See supra note 7.
10. See Michael K Steenson, No-Fault in a Fault Context: Tort Actions and Section
65B.51 of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, 2 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv.
109, 136-41 (1976).
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disfigurement," and "more than six months of complete inability of
the injured person to work in an occupation," to the present, less
restrictive, thresholds." While the reduction in the disability pe-
riod from six months to sixty days is obviously less restrictive, Pro-
fessor Steenson also confirmed that other changes (in particular,
changing the amended language requiring the "permanent loss of
a bodily function" to the present "permanent injury") were in fact
intended to make the thresholds "less restrictive."
2
Ultimately, the Legislature itself stated in section 65B.42(2) of
Minnesota Statutes the purpose of these thresholds, namely, "[t]o
prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident vic-
tims suffering minor injuries by restricting the right to recover general
damages to cases of serious injury.
III. BURDEN OF PROOF
It is well established that the tort thresholds are not affirmative
defenses but are part of the plaintiffs substantive case, and that the
plaintiff, therefore, has the burden of pleading and proving that
they have met a threshold. 14 However, it is clear from the "or" lan-
guage of the Act that the plaintiff need only meet one of the
thresholds in order to recover "non-economic detriment" dam-15
ages. While there was originally some discussion in the confer-
ence committee about limiting recovery to the non-economic det-
riment only from the threshold injury, this would prove to be
unworkable, and the final Act allowed non-economic damages for
all losses once any threshold was met.16
IV. LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATIONS OF TORT THRESHOLDS
It is important to remember that the Act itself limits the appli-
cation of the thresholds, both in the damages it restricts and the
11. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 136, 141 (citing the text of the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, Section 5, and the threshold provisions
of the bill as introduced in the Minnesota Legislature as well as the final version
codified in subdivision 3 of Section 65B.51 of the Minnesota Statutes).
12. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 138 (quoting a tape of the Minnesota Sen-
ate debate on S.F. 96 (May 9, 1973)).
13. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
14. See Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1978); Lipa v. Johnson,
381 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
15. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996).
16. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 142.
[Vol. 24
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type of case in which the thresholds apply. First, the Act only pro-
hibits the recovery of "non-economic detriment" damages' if a
threshold is not met."8 Economic loss claims, on the other hand,
are not subject at all to these thresholds.1 9
Equally important, meeting a threshold is only required for
certain types of actions, defined in the Act as having the following
four characteristics:
1. A negligence cause of action,
2. Accruing as the result of an injury,
3. Arising out of the operation, ownership, maintenance, or
use of a motor vehicle,
4. With respect to which the security required by the Act has
been provided.2°
While the Act thus limits the threshold's application to only
certain types of claims involving a motor vehicle accident, a recent
Minnesota Court of Appeals decision has (incorrectly) expanded
their application. The most common type of claim that involves a
motor vehicle accident but is not a negligence claim is an uninsured
motorist claim (UM), which is a contract action. It had long been
assumed by those practicing in this area that UM claims were not
governing by tort thresholds, but last year, the Court of Appeals
ruled otherwise. In Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 21 the court broadly construed the language of the Act in favor
of the insurer, not the insured, and stated:
Applying these definitions, the phrase "with respect to a
cause of action in negligence" appears to encompass more
than simply "an action in negligence." Properly defined,
the phrase refers to the operative facts underlying a negli-
gence action. Johnson's contract action against her UM
insurer, as required by the statute, arises out of the same
operative facts that give rise to an action in negligence.
Johnson's ability to collect under her UM coverage is
conditioned on the existence of a cause of action in negli-
gence. Consequently, the phrase "with respect to a cause
of action in negligence" could refer to both a negligence
action and the contract action arising from the same op-
17. See supra note 8 for definition of "non-economic detriment."
18. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996) (limiting damages for non-
economic detriment to only those persons meeting the tort thresholds specified).
19. See id.
20. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 1(1996).
21. 574 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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erative facts that is conditioned on the negligence. We
recognize that the official headnote to section 65B.51 re-
fers to "tort recovery" which, again, facially supports John-
son's claim that the legislature intended to limit the No-
Fault thresholds to negligence actions. But the legislature
has expressly provided that such headnotes "are mere
catchwords to indicate the contents of the section or sub-
division and are not part of the statute." Minn Stat. §
645.49 (1996).22
Recognizing that its conclusion benefited uninsured drivers, at the
expense of injured victims, the court strained to support its conclu-
sion:
Johnson argues that when an owner of a vehicle-i.e.,
Jenkins-has failed to obtain coverage for his vehicle, he
should not be allowed to benefit from the No-Fault
thresholds. This argument is supported by several writers
in the area of no-fault benefits. See Michael K Steenson, A
Primer on Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 7
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 313, 388 (1981) (stating that "quid
pro quo for procuring the insurance required by the Act
is the limited tort immunity granted by the tort thresh-
olds. If the security has not been provided, the defendant
is not entitled to that immunity")' Peter H. Berge and
James R. Schwebel, The Practitioner's Guide to the Min-
nesota No-Fault Act § 8.3 (3d ed. 1988) (stating in a suit
against such a driver no threshold need be shown). But
the issues raised in this appeal do not include the issue
whether a suit by Johnson against Jenkins himself would
be subject to the No-Fault thresholds. Johnson seeks re-
covery from State Farm, notJenkins. As Johnson's UM in-
surer, State Farm does not stand in Jenkins's shoes but in
the shoes ofJenkins's absent liability insurer.23
Consequently, the practitioner can no longer be certain that in
other actions in which the plaintiff should not have to meet a
threshold, their application will be limited as the Act intends. This
would include intentional tort claims; a negligence or strict liability
claim against a manufacturer that arose out of the negligent pro-
duction of a motor vehicle; a dramshop claim that arises out of the
illegal sale of liquor; and a claim for property damage. The plain-
tiff must be prepared for a defense attempt to apply the thresholds,
22. Id. at 471.
23. Id. at 472.
[Vol. 24
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and therefore be ready to limit Johnson's holding to UM cases. The
Plaintiff must focus on the Johnson court's reliance on the fact that
"UM insurance is intended to provide the coverage that would have
been provided by the tortfeasor's liability carrier, had the tortfeasor
been insured" and that the insurer who is "standing in the stead of
that theoretical insurer" should "not be deprived of the provisions
that would apply to an actual insurer. 24 The plaintiff must be pre-
pared to show how and why intentional torts, products liability
cases, and so on, fundamentally differ from UM cases, and there-
fore do not call for the application of thresholds.
Subdivisions 4 and 5 of section 65B.51 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes reinforce the point that not all actions are subject to the
thresholds. Subdivision 5 simply repeats that the thresholds only
apply to negligent acts or omissions committed in the "operation,
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle," and do not
"impair or limit tort liability or limit liability or limit the damages
recoverable" in all other actions.2 Subdivision 4 must be under-
stood in conjunction with the Act's definition of "maintenance and
use." Subdivision 4 reads:
Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the liability of
a person in the business of manufacturing, distributing,
retailing, repairing, servicing or maintaining motor vehi-
cles arising from a defect in a motor vehicle caused or not
corrected by an act or omission in the manufacture, in-
spection, repair, servicing or maintenance of a vehicle in
the course of the business.2 6
Even so, "maintenance or use," as used in subdivision 1 of sec-
tion 65B to trigger application of the threshold, is defined to ex-
21
clude claims arising out of the repair or service of vehicles.
V. SPECIFIC THRESHOLDS
A. Medical Expense Threshold
To meet the medical expense threshold, section 65B.51, sub-
24. Id.
25. Id., subd. 5.
26. Id., subd. 4.
27. Id. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (stating that "[m]aintenance or use of a motor vehi-
cle does not include (1) conduct within the course of a business of repairing, serv-
icing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless the conduct occurs off the
business premises").
7
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division 3(a) provides that the "sum of the following" must "ex-
ceed" $4,000:
(1) Reasonable medical expense benefits paid, payable or
payable but for any applicable deductible, plus
(2) The value of free medical or surgical care or ordinary
and necessary nursing services performed by a relative of
the injured person or a member of the injured person's
household, plus
(3) The amount by which the value of reimbursable
medical services or products exceeds the amount of bene-
fit paid, payable, or payable but for an applicable deducti-
ble for those services or products if the injured person was
charged less than the average reasonable amount charged
in this state for similar services or products, minus
(4) The amount of medical expense benefits paid, pay-
able, or payable but for an applicable deductible for diag-
nostic X-rays and for a procedure or treatment for rehabili-
tation and not for remedial turposes or a course of rehabilitative
occupational training....
"Reasonable medical expense benefits" refers to both the
treatment and the cost. "Medical expense benefits" is defined in
section 65B.44 of the Minnesota Statutes as, inter alia:
all reasonable expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-
ray, optical, dental, chiropractic, and rehabilitative serv-
ices, including prosthetic devices, prescription drugs, nec-
essary ambulance and all other reasonable transportation
expenses incurred in traveling to receive covered medical
benefits, hospital, extended care and nursing services.
Hospital room and board benefits may be limited, except
for intensive care facilities, to the regular daily semiprivate
room rates customarily charged by the institution in which
the recipient of benefits is confined.
28. Id. § 65B.51, subd. 3(a) (emphasis added). As originally enacted, the Act
contained a $2,000 medical expense threshold. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 140;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51, Historical and Statutory Notes (West 1996). This was
increased to $4,000 by a 1978 amendment. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51, Histori-
cal and Statutory Notes (West 1996).
29. MiNN. STAT. § 65B.44, subd. 2 (1996). This provision continues:
Such benefits shall also include necessary remedial treatment and serv-
ices recognized and permitted under the laws of this state for an injured
person who relies upon spiritual means through prayer alone for healing
in accordance with that person's religious beliefs. Medical expense loss
includes medical expenses accrued prior to the death of a person not-
[Vol. 24
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In order for a medical expense to be considered under the
Act, it must be for treatment of the injury, as opposed to an ex-
pense related to the litigation. In Krummi v. MSI Insurance Co.,31
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a medical examination
ordered by an attorney to aid in trial preparation was not necessary
medical treatment, and thus not recoverable under no-fault insur-
ance. As explained by the court, to rule otherwise would permit
plaintiffs to meet the threshold merely by attending multiple ex-
aminations.
If claimants are permitted to characterize examinations
conducted for litigation purposes as "medical expenses"
payable under the terms of the No-Fault Act, claimants
will be afforded an opportunity to exceed the required
threshold simply by seeking a sufficient number of exami-
nations and additional opinions to meet the statutory
threshold. The potential hazards of improperly permit-
ting the use of such examinations to meet the medical ex-
pense threshold are aggravated where, as here, the refer-
ral is not by another treating physician who had
concluded that a neurological consultation is necessary,
but rather by plaintiffs counsel in preparation of a per-
sonal injury case.
Even so, the court also recognized that there could be circum-
stances where active treatment is not rendered, but the examina-
tion might still be necessary for the ultimate treatment of the in-
j~y34
jury. 4
For example, a patient may be seeking a second opinion
from another doctor before approving major surgery.
This may be a necessary medical examination, but it is not
an examination conducted by a doctor for the purpose of
treating the patient. While the doctor rendering the sec-
ond opinion is only providing advice and consultation and
is not directly providing treatment, his opinion is a neces-
sary part of the overall treatment of the patient. The sec-
withstanding the fact that benefits are paid or payable to the decedent's
survivors. Medical expense benefits for rehabilitative services shall be
subject to the provisions of section 65B.45.
See id.
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ond opinion would then be reimbursable because it is
necessary to, and a part of, the treatment.
There are also a number of other significant restrictions on
which medical expenses can be used to meet the tort threshold.
First, in Coughlin v. LaBounty,36 the court held that future medical
expenses may not be included for the purpose of meeting the
threshold. Looking to the language of section 65B.51, the court
reasoned:
The language itself, "paid, payable or payable but for
an[y] applicable deductible," indicates that the legislature
intended to measure the seriousness by the reasonable
medical expenses incurred in the past rather than the fu-
ture. As Professor Steenson notes, "[The statute] pre-
cludes consideration of future medical expenses in com-
puting the tort threshold."37
In another, often overlooked, clause of section 65B.51, the
statute itself prohibits the inclusion of "diagnostic x-ray" costs in
meeting the tort threshold.38 In Rivard v. McGinns,39 the jury de-
termined that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent injury,
and the plaintiff was left with only his medical expenses to meet the
threshold. His medical expenses totaled $4,245, but the x-rays cost
$595 of that amount.4O
The court explained:
[t]he reason for deducting diagnostic X-rays from the
medical expense computation is, apparently, to remove
any incentive to reach for the tort threshold by resort to
easily inflated expenses. The same reason seems to apply
to the exclusion for non-occupational or nonremedial re-
habilitation expenses.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that these x-rays
were really remedial, and not simply diagnostic.42
35. Id.
36. 354 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
37. Id. (citations omitted) (citing MICHAEL K STEENSON, MINNESOTA No-
FAULTAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 161 (1982)).
38. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3(a) (4) (1996) (stating that the medical
expenses threshold of $4,000 shall not include "[t] he amount of medical expense
benefits paid.., for diagnostic X-rays. .. ).
39. 454 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing Michael K. Steenson, A Primer on Minnesota No-Fault Automo-
bile Insurance, 7 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 313, 390 (1981)).
42. See Rivard, 454 N.W.2d at 454.
[Vol. 24
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Even if there was testimony specifically describing the x-
rays in this case as "remedial," we would have to disagree
with such a label. "Remedial" may be defined as
"[s]upplying a remedy" or cure. The x-rays here did not
provide any relief or remedy to Rivard for his condition.
While there may be times when certain types of x-rays are
remedial, such as for treatment of cancer, this is not one
of those instances.43
Finally, the court determined that while the legislative purpose
in excluding diagnostic x-ray may have been to prevent plaintiffs
from using them to try to reach a threshold, the intent of the plain-
tiff and/or his doctor wasn't important when the statutory lan-
guage was "clear and unambiguous.
As further support for its decision, the trial court in this
case emphasized it was "firmly convinced that [the x-rays]
were ordered for remedial purposes and not in any at-
tempt to reach for the tort threshold." Reliance on legis-
lative intent is not permitted when the language of a stat-
ute is clear and unambiguous.... The fact the x-rays in
this case were not ordered in an attempt to reach the tort• 45
threshold is therefore unimportant.
Consequently, the law is clear - diagnostic x-rays are excluded
from the calculation of the medical expense threshold. The only
appellate decision on whether the term "diagnostic x-ray" also in-
cludes MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) and CAT (computer as-
sisted tomography) scans is the unreported case of Safinia v.
Kruse.4  Because MRI's use a magnetic field (compared to CAT
scans, which use x-rays assisted by computer imaging), MRI's are
not included in the plain language of the statute.
However, the Safinia court, in conclusory fashion, ruled that
the purpose of the statute was to exclude all diagnostic (as opposed
to remedial) expenses, and included MRI and CAT scans in the
definition of "x-rays". 7 Given this, the practitioner would be well
43. Id. at 455 (citations omitted) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1045
(2d ed. 1982)).
44. See Rivard, 454 N.W.2d at 455.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. No. C8-96-1623, 1997 WL 118200 (Minn. Ct. App. March 18, 1997), review
denied, (Minn. May 28, 1997).
47. See id. at *2. This finding runs contrary to statutory construction rules
under which one would expect an exclusion of coverage from a remedial statute to
be strictly construed. See, e.g., Stang v. Minnesota Teachers Retirement Assoc. Bd.
of Trustees, 566 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that since the
11
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advised to exclude all forms of diagnostic imaging from calcula-
tions of threshold amounts.
It is also important to keep in mind that subdivision 3 (a) (4) of
section 65B.51 also excludes expenses for treatment for rehabilita-
tion which are: (1) not remedial, or (2) for occupational pur-48
poses. This means that expenses for rehabilitation which are de-
signed to enable a person to better adjust to a physical limitation,
but do not fall into the categories of physical or medical therapy or
occupational retraining, are subtracted.
B. Permanent Disfigurement or Permanent Injury
The Act itself does not define the terms "injury" or "disfigure-
ment," and to date, no reported Minnesota decision has provided
any interpretation or definition that adds anything to the ordinary
meaning of the terms. While the Minnesota Jury Instruction Guide
(JIG) gives definitions of each term,49 it cites no Minnesota author-
ity for these definitions. Nevertheless, these definitions have be-
come widely accepted by the bench and bar, and counsel can gen-
erally assume that JIG 600, containing these definitions will be
given to the jury. These definitions are as follows:
Disfigurement
A disfigurement is that which impairs or injures the ap-
pearance of a person.50
Permanent Injury
A permanent injury is one from which it is reasonably cer-
tain a person will not fully recover. Such injury may im-
prove or worsen, but must be reasonably certain to con-
tinue to some degree throughout the person's life.51
While the original no-fault bill as first introduced required a
specified degree of severity for both a permanent injury and a
permanent disfigurement (requiring a "significant" permanent in-
"teachers retirement statutes are remedial in nature, they are entitled to liberal
construction to insure the beneficial purposes intended" and thus any exclusions
are "strictly interpreted"). However, this aspect of the issue was not addressed by
the Safinia court. See Safinia, 1997 WL 118200, at *2.
48. SeeMINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3(a) (4) (1996).
49. See MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCrION GUIDES,
MINNESOTAJURY INSTRUCrION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 600 (Michael K Steenson, rep.)
in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 402-03 (3d ed. 1986).
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jury and a "serious" permanent disfigurement), both of these quali-
fying terms were ultimately omitted from the final Act.52 Because
one of the primary purposes of the Act was to separate out so-called
minor injuries and "restrict[] the right to recover general damages
to cases of serious injury," s the question that naturally arises is
whether the omission of these qualifying terms was meant to lessen
the severity of the injury required, i.e. whether any permanent in-
jury or disfigurement, no matter how minor it might seem, would
meet the threshold.
The legislative history shows that the word "significant" was de-
leted to avoid use of a vague term difficult of legal application,54 but
the legislative history is otherwise not terribly helpful, and Profes-
sor Steenson has concluded that it "presents no conclusive an-
swers."55 What seems the most logical way to view the omission of
the qualifying terms of "serious" and "significant" is that the Legis-
lature concluded that any permanent harm that befalls a person is,
by the very fact of its permanency, serious enough to justify the al-
lowance of non-economic damages.
The bottom line for the practitioner is that the plain language
of the statute cannot be added to by any qualifying language such
as serious or significant; and once there is evidence in the record
that the injury or disfigurement is permanent in nature, it then be-
comes a jury issue of whether the threshold is met. In order to es-
tablish this evidence of a permanent injury or disfigurement, medi-
56
cal evidence is usually necessary.
While certain injuries or disfigurements may be so obviously
permanent that a person could meet the threshold as a matter of
law even without medical evidence (i.e. the loss of a limb or massive
burn injuries), the plaintiff in these cases is surely going to present
medical evidence cases to establish the full extent of the harm.
Even though a plaintiff might be tempted in the case of a minor
scar injury to establish permanency without medical evidence, the
52. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
53. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
54. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 138.
55. See Steenson, supra note 10, at 147.
56. See Kissner v. Norton, 412 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing summary judgment was properly granted against plaintiff who offered no
medical evidence of permanency except the letter of a doctor stating she had a
"disability of her spine"); Marose v. Hennameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding the plaintiffs affidavit, as the only evidence of the perma-
nency of her injury, was insufficient).
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defense may argue that the plaintiff has not met his burden of es-
tablishing that the disfigurement will never heal or disappear, and
the far safer course is to establish the fact of the permanency by
competent medical evidence in order to guarantee that the case
will go to the jury.
Although the issue has not arisen in Minnesota, other jurisdic-
tions have addressed the issue of the death of a fetus or a stillbirth,
and whether it is classified as a permanent injury, a death, or ei-
ther.57 If the fetus is viewed as part of a woman's body, it should be
considered a permanent injury. If it is viewed as an individual life,
581then the loss would be considered a death . In a New York case
the court held that the death of a fetus was neither an injury to the
mother nor a death, 59 a decision the New York legislature found so
contrary to the spirit of the no-fault law that they amended the in-
60jury threshold to include loss of a fetus.
C. Sixty Days of Disability
Subdivision 3(c) of Section 65B.51 defines disability for
threshold purposes as the "inability to engage in substantially all of
the injured person's usual and customary daily activities."6 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that this threshold requires
61only sixty cumulative days, and not sixty consecutive days. In addi-
tion, a plaintiffs own testimony about his injury, his time off from
work, and his limitation of movement, have been found sufficient
evidence to create ajury issue as to whether the disability threshold
63was met.
57. For example, Section 39:6A-8(a) of the NewJersey Statutes includes "loss
of fetus" among the various personal injuries covered under the "verbal threshold
option" of the No-Fault Insurance Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 1996).
NewJersey insureds may elect instead a "tort option" which has a higher premium
but "permits unrestricted recovery of noneconomic damages." Jimenex v. Baglieri,
704 A.2d 1285, 1288 (N.J. 1998). See also infra note 60 and accompanying text.
58. See Roberts v. Hazle Yellow Cab Co., 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 126 (Penn. Comm.
Pleas 1979); Raymond v. Bartsch, 84 A.D.2d 60, 447 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1981).
59. See Raymond, 84 A.D.2d at 61, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (holding that "loss of the
fetus [did not] constitute... 'permanent loss of use of a body organ, member,
function or system' under New York's No-Fault Insurance Law).
60. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102(d) (McKinney 1997), as amended in 1984 by L.
1984, c. 955, § 4 (including "loss of fetus" in the definition of "serious injury").
61. MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3(c) (1996) (emphasis added).
62. See Lindner v. Lund, 352 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Steenson, supra note 10, at 151).
63. SeeLipav.Johnson, 381 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 24
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The practitioner should be aware, however, of the tendency of
some courts to restrictively construe this definition of disability. In
a number of decisions, the court of appeals has ruled as a matter of
law that the particular descriptions of what the plaintiff could not
do during the sixty day period did not rise to the level of "disability"
required by the statute. 6
For example, in Safinia v. Kruse, the plaintiff claimed that he
was unable to do karate or play soccer or racquetball for part of a
year, and could not complete his normal household chores because
standing for more than ten or fifteen minutes was painful. The
plaintiff also alleged that he suffered pain while standing, walking,
or sitting, and had to stretch or lie down on occasion to relieve the
16pain. The court ruled that these facts were insufficient to meet the
tort threshold requiring that Safinia prove that his injury resulted
67in disability of 60 days or more. The court stated that it has con-
strued "the statute's definition of disability as requiring a significant
loss of the ability to work. In this instance, Safinia missed no work
as a resalt of the accident; therefore, we must conclude that he was
able to engage in this usual and customary daily activity.68
64. SeeSafiniav. Kruse, No. C8-96-1623, 1997WL 118200, *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
March 18, 1997), review denied, (Minn. May 28, 1997). (reversing jury finding that
plaintiff was disabled for sixty days or more because he did not miss work as a re-
sult of the accident); Burks v. Citywide Cab Co., No. C8-90-2581, 1991 WI 34671,
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. March 19, 1991), review denied, (Minn. May 10, 1991) (affirm-
ing summaryjudgment for defendants where three-year-old plaintiff who suffered
a broken leg was able to put weight on the leg within eight days of the injury and
provided no evidence that she was unable "to engage in substantially all of her
usual and customary daily activities"); Kissner v. Norton, 412 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding plaintiff could not have been disabled for sixty
days where she only missed four days of work and did not provide any evidence
that she was "unable to 'engage in substantially all of her usual and customary
daily activities'"); Lindner v. Lund, 352 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (af-
firming summary judgment for lack of sixty days of disability where plaintiffs only
evidence was that he missed some family activities, was confined to the house for
only three days, and was not confined to bed or hospitalized); Marose v. Hen-
nameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding plaintiff did not
meet sixty day threshold where she was off work for a total of nine days and was
seen at a clinic only six days).
65. No. C8-96-1623, 1997 WL 118200, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. March 18, 1997),
review denied, (Minn. May 28, 1997).
66. See id.
67. See id. at *2.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
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VI. EVIDENTIARY BURDENS AND OTHER LIABILITY
While the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving
that he or she has met a threshold,69 the defendant will be consid-
ered to have waived the issue if it is not raised at trial or in the for-
7'mulation of a special verdict. Defendants are not required to
submit their own medical testimony to contest the plaintiffs medi-
cal proof.7' In Nemanic v. Gopher Heating and Sheet Metal, Inc.,72 the
court held that the defendant could contest the plaintiffs proof
and create a jury issue simply by a cross examination of the plain-
tiff's expert witness and the introduction of the plaintiffs medical
records.
Finally, it is important to remember that in cases where liability
against co-defendants is premised on theories other than negli-
gence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the failure to meet a
threshold may affect the plaintiffs right to recover against one de-
fendant but not others, and a defendant not directly liable to the
plaintiff for failure to meet a threshold may still have liability for
contribution.73 In Moose Club v. LaBounty,74 the Court of Appeals
held that the thresholds are a technical defense resulting in no re-
covery, but they are not a determination of no liability. Thus, a
finding that the plaintiff did not meet a threshold does not destroy
common liability for the purpose of contribution.75
VII. CONCLUSION
In the interest of ensuring a quick recovery for the most seri-
ously injured automobile accident victims, the tort thresholds of
the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act deny another class of vic-
tims recovery of non-economic detriment damages. Given this,
69. See Lipa v.Johnson, 381 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
70. See Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1978).
71. See, e.g., Nemanic v. Gopher Heating & Sheet Metal, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 667,
670 (Minn. 1983) (noting that since the burden is on the plaintiff to provide
medical evidence, the defendant simply has to raise an issue of whether the
threshold was met).
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Moose Club v. LaBounty, 442 N.W.2d 334, 337-39 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that a finding by the trial court that the plaintiff had not met the
tort thresholds simply meant the plaintiff could not recover general damages un-
der the No-Fault Act, but not that defendants were not liable under other legal
theories).
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practicing attorneys representing those potentially "less seriously"
injured plaintiffs must be concerned with whether the facts of a
particular case allow for recovery under the No-Fault Act. In par-
ticular, attorneys should familiarize themselves with the case law
discussing the types of procedures which may or may not be aggre-
gated toward the "$4,000 in medical treatment" threshold, or those
cases addressing the "sixty days of disability" under the No-Fault
Act. Careful analysis of these issues in the early stages of the litiga-
tion may be useful to prevent unproductive litigation and allow the
attorney to develop more realistic expectations among clients.
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